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THE TRUTH COMES NATURALLY! DOES IT? 
Abstract  
Does the truth come naturally? And by implication, does this mean that a lie may not come as 
naturally as the truth? Truth-Default Theory (TDT) and the Information Manipulation Theory 
2 (IMP2) diverge in their opinion on whether people´s natural response is to lie or tell the 
truth. In line with TDT, cognitive psychology research fits supports the notion that the truth is 
the default in human communication. IMP2 holds that lying may come as naturally, or even 
more naturally than truth telling, and recent social psychology research supports this 
possibility. We suggest that motivation may explain the divergence between the two theories 
and the two lines of research. We raise the hypothesis that truth telling may be the natural 
response absent clear motivations to lie (hence, most human communication), and that lying 
may prevail as the automatic reaction when it brings about important self-profit. We hope 
that this hypothesis will stimulate new research that will allow for bridging the theoretical 
and empirical findings that seem discrepant at first, and show when the truth (vs the lie) 
comes naturally.  
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Oh my goodness, is it already half past six? You realize you will be late. You jump on your 
bike and pedal as fast as you can. As if Murphy is involved, a policeman stops you, warning 
you that your bike lights are off. ‘But officer, I am in a hurry. I did not realize. I simply forgot 
to switch on my light’.  
While the denial in the example above may sound entirely plausible, it is also clear that the 
situation brings about the motivation to lie (e.g., to avoid penalty, or losing time). The crucial 
question in deception research - whether fundamental or applied - is the question of what 
distinguishes lie from truth. Both Truth-Default Theory (TDT) and the Information 
Manipulation Theory 2 (IMP2) are thus welcomed for providing well-articulated suggestions 
on how and when deceptive and truthful communication may differ. Here, we focus on one 
aspect covered in both theories: Does the truth come naturally? And by implication, does this 
mean that a lie may not come as naturally as the truth?  
Truth automaticity: Viewpoint from TDT and IMP2 
Central to the Truth-Default Theory (TDT) is the idea that we typically believe what other 
say. Gilbert (1991) elegantly argued that the truth is simply the most efficient way of 
communication. It would be a waste of time and effort to evaluate the truth status of each 
incoming message. Of course, the reasoning only holds if most messages are actually truthful. 
Important support for TDT therefore comes from data showing (1) that most people report 
telling the truth most of the time, and (2) the truth bias in evaluating human communication, 
that is, people´s tendency to overestimate the chance that a message is truthful rather than 
deceptive. The core tenet of TDT is that ´…when humans communicate with other humans, 
we tend to operate on a default presumption that what the other person says is basically 
honest (pp3)´. Note that TDT emphasizes truth default in evaluating human communication. 
This focus provides valuable insights in how we receive incoming messages, yet from the 
applied perspective of lie detection, it is probably more important to know whether the truth 
also comes naturally in the sender´s behavior.  
TDT Proposition #1 that 'most communication by most people is honest most of the 
time' implies that humans also have a truth bias in sending information. The perspective of 
the sender is more fully addressed by the Information Manipulation Theory 2 (IMT2). IMT2 
considers how lie production originates. IMT2 relies heavily on the idea that humans wish to 
maximize efficiency in all aspects of behavior, including communication. Fully embracing 
the efficiency perspective, IMT2 holds that deceptive communication must be efficient in 
terms of effort/reward ratio if not one would opt for honest communication. Indeed, ´high 
cognitive load is not intrinsic to deceptive discourse production (pp.29)´ and ´must present 
cognitive efficiency advantages over truth telling within many contexts. – Even more 
efficient than truth telling´ (pp12). Unlike TDT, IMT2 therefore does not take truth 
automaticity in human discourse for granted, and states that lying may even be the more 
natural response. We think this is an interesting point of divergence between the two theories, 
and now address empirical research from cognitive and social psychology speaking to this 
issue.  
Cognitive Psychology 
Using a variety of methods, researchers have tried to map the mental effort it takes to lie 
versus tell the truth. The most direct way has been to ask people how much effort it took 
them to produce a deceptive or truthful message. People find lying more difficult than truth 
telling (Caso, Gnisci, Vrij, & Mann, 2005; Vrij, Semin, & Bull, 1996). As self-report may be 
biased by response tendencies, most other studies used indirect measures to assess the 
cognitive complexity of lying and truth telling. Brain imaging studies consistently found that 
lying is associated with greater activity in brain regions that have been related to cognitive 
control than truth telling (Christ, Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009; Farah, 
Hutchinson, Phelps, & Wagner, 2014; Gamer, 2011). Following the logic of mental 
chronometry (Donders, 1868/1969), reaction times can also provide an index of the speed of 
performing cognitive operations. When people are instructed to answer questions as fast as 
possible, they are reliably slower to produce a deceptive answer than to produce a truthful 
answer (see e.g., Agosta, Pezzoli, & Sartori, 2013; Debey, Verschuere, & Crombez, 2012; 
Fullam, Mckie, & Dolan, 2009; Gregg, 2007; Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & 
Castiello, 2008; Spence et al., 2001; Spence, Kaylor-Hughes, Farrow, & Wilkinson, 2008; 
Suchotzki, Verschuere, Crombez, & De Houwer, 2013; Vendemia, Buzan, & Green, 2005; 
Verschuere & De Houwer, 2011; Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011; Walczyk, 
Mahoney, Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross, 2009). People also err more often when giving 
deceptive responses, thereby revealing the truth. Recording of muscle activity further reveals 
that even for successful deceptive responding, people are initially inclined to give the truthful 
response (Hadar, Makris, & Yarrow, 2012; Seymour & Schumacher, 2009). Likewise, 
tracking people´s arm movements using a Nintendo Wii, it was shown that there is a 
deviation towards the truth while giving deceptive answers (Duran, Dale, & McNamara, 
2010). In sum, using a variety of methods, cognitive psychological research suggests that the 
first thing to come to mind is the truth (e.g., ´Yes, I know my light is off´, in the example 
above). Humans have the flexibility to produce an alternative, deceptive response, but this 
comes with a substantial and measurable cost. 
Social Psychology 
More recently, social psychology also began exploring whether the tendency to tell the truth 
prevails. Reasoning that people´s natural response is to serve self-interest, social 
psychologists have hypothesized that lying may be one´s automatic response when it clearly 
serves one's self-interest. Indeed, people have been found to lie more when acting under time 
pressure compared to when they had more time to deliberate on how to act (Gunia, Wang, 
Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 2012; Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012). For example, in 
Shalvi et al.'s (2012) work, participants received a die they could privately roll and earned 
money based on the outcome they reported rolling (see also Halevy, Shalvi, & Verschuere, 
2014; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011; Shalvi, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). 
Higher numbers meant higher pay. Since participants die rolls were truly private, lying was 
analyzed only on the aggregate level assessing if the distribution of reported outcomes 
deviated from the one expected if participants were reporting honestly. In one experimental 
condition participants were instructed to report within a given short time-frame, while in 
another condition no time-frame was introduced, allowing participants to report whenever 
they wished to do so. In two experiments, participants who had to act under time pressure not 
only reported their die roll outcome quicker, but also reported rolling higher outcomes 
compared to participants not forced to report quickly.  
The finding that people lie more under time pressure, when confronted with a 
tempting situation in which lying may serve their self-interest, is in line with recent work 
showing that being depleted leads people to lie more compared to when people have more 
mental resources. Specifically, people lie more to secure profit, (1) after engaging in a 
depleting (rather than a non-depleting) task (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011; Mead, 
Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009), (2) when there are sleep deprived (Barnes, 
Schaubroeck, Huth, & Ghumman, 2011), and (3) later during the day (when they are tired) 
compared to when they wake up in the morning and are relatively fresh (Kouchaki & Smith, 
2014). Together, this line of work in social psychology suggests that in tempting situations, 
people are inclined to lie in order to boost personal profit.     
The power of motivation  
Not only do TDT and IMT2 diverge in their opinion on whether people´s natural response is 
to lie or tell the truth, empirical research from cognitive versus social psychology also seem 
to provide radically different answers. While there are many differences between the two 
fields (e.g., focus on cognition versus behavior), perhaps the most notable one is the 
difference in motivation (see also Levine, Kima, & Hamela, 2010). In cognitive psychology, 
people are typically instructed to lie. The idea is that experimenters provide such instructions 
to avoid ending up with an imbalance in truthful and deceptive responses, potentially 
confounding the lie-truth comparisons. In contrast, social psychological research typically 
provides people with the opportunity to either lie or tell the truth. This gap in experimental 
approach calls for research manipulating the extent to which lying serves self-interest (vs. not) 
and examine whether truth telling would be the dominant response in both cases – as 
suggested by cognitive psychology research and implied by TDT – or lying is the default 
option when it serves self-interest – as suggested by social psychology research and 
consistent with the cost-benefit analysis of what one has to gain (or not lose) from saying the 
truth (vs. lying) by IMT2.  
In line with IMT2, our analysis leads us to stress the importance of mapping the 
circumstances under which honesty or rather deception will prevail as being the most 
dominant response. Motivation seems a key factor, yet several other factors seem of 
relevance too. As argued by McCornack (1997) the ecological validity of the cognitive 
psychology research paradigms can be questioned, and it is important to not only study 
blatant lies. but also examine the automaticity of half-truths and the effort it takes to tell well-
packaged lies. Experience with deception may also influence the cognitive costs of lying. 
Some people (i.e., pathological liars, psychopathic individuals) lie very frequently, and it is 
conceivable that practice makes perfect. What may be much more common, however, is 
frequent lying about specific behaviors. Most people have secrets (Kelly & McKillop, 1996), 
and secrecy by definition involves a form of deception. Cognitive psychology research has 
begun to address this issue, and indicates that frequent lying with regard to specific matters 
may indeed erase the cognitive costs of lying (Verschuere et al., 2011).  
Concluding remarks 
Both TDT and IMT2 shed fascinating light on the question – does the truth come naturally? 
While TDT highlights people general tendency to infer honesty in others' communication, 
IMT2 suggests that people's production of honest vs. dishonest communication depends on 
the outcome of an analysis weighing costs versus the benefits of lying. Here, we surveyed 
recent literature, discovering a noteworthy discrepancy with cognitive psychology research 
supporting TDT and social psychology research supporting IMT2. In this review we suggest 
that motivation may be a key ingredient that could allow bridging some theoretical aspects 
that seem discrepant at first. We raise the hypothesis that truth telling may be the natural 
response absent clear motivations to lie (hence, most human communication), and that lying 
may prevail as the automatic reaction when it brings about important self-profit. Only future 
empirical investigation, which we warmly encourage, will allow assessing whether this 
possibility is indeed true. Such future investigation will benefit from considering the 
proposed approach integrating valuable insights from both TDT and IMT2. Finally, we wish 
to point out that testing the role of motivation in truth default status is not only of theoretical, 
but also practical importance. Researchers (Vrij & Granhag, 2012) and private companies 
(e.g., http://www.noliemri.com/) advocate using mental effort to discriminate lie from truth. 
Clearly, in the forensic context, lying may serve self-interest, confirming the importance of 
assessing how self-interest affects truth automaticity.  
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